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Commerical Bribery: The Need
for Legislation in Minnesota
In view of the structure of the modern business organization and the demands made upon the individual by present-day business, both the opportunitiesfor, and the practice of, influencing the agents of others are increasing.
The author of this Note examines the civil remedies and
criminal sanctions against commercial bribery presently
available both in Minnesota and in other jurisdictions.
He concludes that existing Minnesota law is inadequate
as a deterrent to commercial bribery and suggests specific legislation designed to meet the problem.
INTRODUCTION
Every man has his price,
I will bribe left and right.
Lytton, Walpole,
Act II, Scene 2
As commonly understood, bribery is the act of giving or receiving a gift for the purpose of effecting the improper discharge of a
public duty. The term bribery and the act it signifies is not limited,
however, to the corrupt influencing of public officers. Bribery also
denotes the act of giving or receiving a gift for the purpose of influencing any agent to improperly discharge a duty entrusted to
him by a private individual or corporation.' The latter form of
bribery normally occurs with reference to a commercial transaction-as where an agent receives money or other concessions 2 from
1. A bribe is defined as "A price, reward, gift or favor bestowed or
promised with a view to pervert the judgment or corrupt the conduct of a
person in a position of trust, as an official or a voter." WEBSTER, NEW
INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 333 (2d ed. 1947). Commercial bribery itself
has been judicially defined as "the advantage which one competitor secures
over his fellow competitors by his secret and corrupt dealing with employees
or agents of prospective purchasers." American Distilling Co. v. Wisconsin
Liquor Co., 104 F.2d 582, 585 (7th Cir. 1939).
One writer has impliedly suggested that commercial bribery statutes
should seek only to protect principals against the corrupt act of an agent
or other person in a position of trust. See Note, 108 U. PA. L. REv. 848
(1960). This is not disputed. However, if such statutes are to effectively
deter corrupt acts, strict prohibition against the acceptance of any gift may
be required in some instances. See text accompanying notes 121-24 infra.
2. The bribes at which commercial bribery statutes are directed usually
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the briber in return for the agent's effort to further the briber's interests in business dealings between the briber and the principal.
There is general agreement that bribery, both public and commercial, must be deterred.3 Although all jurisdictions have laws which
proscribe public bribery,' there is a definite lack of control over
commercial bribery.5
The purpose of this Note is to examine Minnesota statutory and
case law which may be applicable to commercial bribery, to analyze
the effectiveness of such law, and to propose specific legislation
to cure any inadequacies. This Note will also consider civil remedies and criminal sanctions against nongovernmental corruption
available both in Minnesota and in other jurisdictions.
I.

CIVIL REMEDIES

The rules of agency applicable in Minnesota provide a principal
with several civil remedies against both a briber and a bribee.
Some of the remedies are cumulative; others are alternative. The
remedies available to the principal of a disloyal agent against the
briber are: (1) a right to rescind any contract induced by the
agent as a result of the bribe; and (2) a right to sue the briber for
damages resulting from the bribe. The remedies available to the
principal against the bribee are: (1) a right to recover the amount
of the bribe from the disloyal agent; (2) a right to sue the disloyal agent for damages resulting from the bribe; (3) a right to
dismiss the disloyal agent; and (4) a right to withhold compensation for the agent's disloyal service.6
A.

RIGHTS AGAINST THE BRIBER

If without the principal's knowledge the negotiating agent accepts compensation from the other party to the transaction, untake one of three forms; money, gifts and entertainment, and salesmen's

subsidies. See Note, 108 U. PA. L. REv. 848 (1960).

3. See FLYNN, GRAFT IN BusiNEss 108 (1931); HENDERSON, THE FED(1924); JONES, TRADE AssocIATIoN
ACTIVITIES AND THE LAW 34-43 (1922); Eliasberg, Corruption and Bribery,
42 J. CRIM. L., C. & P.S. 317 (1951); Ivamy, Bribery of Agents, 16 SOL.
245 (1949); Note, 45 HARv. L. REv. 1248 (1932); Note, 28 COLUM. L.
REV. 799 (1928).
4. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. §§ 613.02-.11 (1957).
ERAL TRADE COMMISSION 224-25

5. The various statutes dealing with commercial bribery have been collected and categorized at 108 U. PA. L. REv. 848, 866 (1960).
6. The extent to which commercial bribery constitutes fraud-thus
making available to the principal the remedies of rescission of fraudulently
induced contracts and an action for damages against the participants in
the fraud-will be discussed later in connection with criminal fraud. See
text accompanying notes 41-49 infra.
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der Minnesota law the principal may rescind the transaction. 7 Generally, this right is not limited to the commercial bribery situation. Moreover, it is available despite a lack of intent to deceive"
and even though the third party was ignorant of the fact of the
prior agency.' In Olson v. Pettibone,0 the principal engaged an
agent to sell his resort business. This agent, secretly in the employ
of the principal's arch business rival, arranged a clandestine sale to
the competitor. In an action to rescind the contract, the Minnesota
Supreme Court held that since the principal was ignorant of his
agent's other employment he had an absolute right to rescind the
sale without a showing of either injury or intent to deceive. Olson
and its progeny" have clearly established the principal's right to
rescind transactions negotiated in whole or in part by a disloyal
agent. However, where the disloyal agent merely influences the
principal's decision to enter into the transaction and does not actually conduct the negotiations himself, the existence of a right
of rescission is less certain. 2
In Minnesota, as in most jurisdictions," the principal's right to
7. See Boulevard Plaza Corp. v. Campbell, 254 Minn. 123, 94 N.W.2d
273 (1959); Doyen v. Bauer, 211 Minn. 140, 300 N.W. 451 (1941); Olive
v.Taylor, 182 Minn. 327, 234 N.W. 466 (1931); Olson v. Pettibone, 168
Minn. 414, 210 N.W. 149 (1926); 1 DUNNELL MnN. DIG. Agency § 198

(1951).
8.See Olson v.Pettibone, 168 Minn. 414, 417, 210 N.W. 149, 150
(1926). The court stated that the party ignorant of the double employment
may rescind "without showing any. injury or intent to deceive."
9. The general rule is that if neither party has knowledge of the dual
agency the contract is voidable at the option of either. See Gordon v. Beck,
196 Cal. 768, 239 Pac. 309 (1925); Empire State Ins. Co. v. American
Cent. Ins. Co., 138 N.Y. 446, 34 N.E. 200 (1893);

RESTATEMENT

(SEc-

AGENCY § 313(c) (1958); Comment, 2 STAN. L. Rnv. 574 (1950).
This rule, however, may not apply in Minnesota. Cf. Olive v. Taylor, 182
Minn. 327, 234 N.W. 466 (1931).
10. 168 Minn. 414, 210 N.W. 149 (1926).
11. See cases cited in note 9 supra.
12. See Boulevard Plaza Corp. v. Campbell, 254 Minn. 123, 131, 94
N.W.2d 273, 281 (1959). Although the agent actually handled the transaction in this case, the specific questionable conduct approved by the court
was the agent's failure to communicate to the principal all the facts within
his knowledge which "might affect his [the principal's] rights or interests."
See also 1 DtJNNELL MINN. DiG. Agency § 198 (1951), which states that
the right to rescind exists if the contract required the exercise of discretion
by the agent.
13. The New York courts have allowed recovery against the briber in
OND),

Donemar, Inc. v. Malloy, 252 N.Y. 360, 169 N.E. 610 (1930); Heam v.
Schuchman, 150 App. Div. 476, 135 N.Y. Supp. 52 (1912); In re Browning's Estate, 176 Misc. 308, 27 N.Y.S.2d 313 (Surr. Ct. 1941). However,
a New Jersey court, in Kuntz v. Tonnele, 80 N.J. Eq. 373, 84 Atl. 624

(Ch. 1912), refused affirmative recovery on the basis of the secret payment
alone. There appears to be a lack of authority upon the issue inother jurisdictions.
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recover damages from the briber is an open question. 4 The Restatement of Agency takes the position that any "person who
. . . intentionally causes or assists an agent to violate a duty to his
principal is subject to liability to the principal."' 5 Since by definition a bribe is intended to cause the agent to disregard his duty to
the principal, application of the Restatement rule would seem to
allow the recovery of damages from the successful commercial
briber. Furthermore, the Restatement provides specifically that if
the third party knows of the principal-agent relationship and
engages the negotiating agent to act in his behalf, that third party
is liable to the principal. 6 As an alternative to proving actual
damage, the Restatement suggests that the principal should at least
be able to collect the amount of the bribe from the third party.'
Inasmuch as it is difficult to argue that a briber should not be
liable for the damage he has intentionally caused, it seems probable that in a case of first impression the Minnesota Supreme
Court would follow the lead of the Restatement and allow the
principal to recover from the commercial briber.
B.

RIGHTS AGAINST THE DISLOYAL AGENT (TiE BRIBEE)

The principal has an absolute right to recover the amount of the
bribe from his disloyal agent.'" This right does not require a
14. Arguably, the right to recover damages is unavailable in Minnesota.
This argument is based on the fact that while the Minnesota court has often
upheld the right of a principal to rescind the contract, it has failed to
mention the availability of the alternative right to recover damages. See
cases cited in note 9 supra. However, the court's apparent failure to recognize the right to recover damages may be explained by the fact that the
right to damages is not co-extensive with the right to. rescind. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND), AGENCY § 313 (1958).
15. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND), AGENCY § 312 (1958).

16. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), AGENCY § 313 (1958) reads as follows:
(1) A Person who, knowing that the other party to a transaction
has employed an agent to conduct a transaction for him, employs the
agent on his own account in such transaction is subject to liability
to the other party, unless he reasonably believes that the other party
acquiesces in the double employment.
(2) If without knowledge of the common agency, two persons employ the same agent to conduct a transaction between them, the transaction is voidable at the election of either.
17. See comments to RESTATEMENT (SECOND),

AGENCY § 313 (1958),

which state that the recovery of the amount of the bride is an alternative
right. The liability of the third party-the amount of the bribe-fixed by
the leading case of Salford v. Lever, [1891] 1 Q.B. 168, has been extended
by a holding that damages are presumptively equal to the amount of the
bribe. Donemar, Inc. v. Malloy, 252 N.Y. 260, 169 N.E. 610 (1930).
In In re Browning's Estate, 176 Misc. 308, 27 N.Y.S.2d 318 (Surr. Ct.
1941), the rationale for the rule is stated to be that the contract price was
"loaded" by the amount of the bribe.
18. Tarnowski v. Resop, 236 Minn. 33, 51 N.W.2d 801 (1952); Magee
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showing of damage; it exists even if the transaction was profitable
to the principal. 9 Furthermore, the remedy is cumulative. That
is, the principal may recover the amount of the bribe from his disloyal agent in addition to recovering actual damages from the
agent or the briber, or in addition to rescinding the contract induced by the disloyal agent.20 Hence, in some cases the principal
may recover an amount greater than the actual injury sustained.
The agent is also liable to the principal for all damages resulting
from his disloyalty. Thus, in the leading case of Tarnowski v. Resop, the Minnesota Supreme Court held that in addition to the
amount of the bribe the principal could recover all damages caused
by the agent's disloyalty. The agent who negotiated the principal's
purchase of the briber's juke-box business was held liable to the
principal for: (1) the losses suffered in operating the business
prior to rescission of the purchase; (2) the time lost by the principal in operating a worthless business; (3) the expenses incurred in
connection with the rescission action; (4) the non-taxable expenses
incurred in prosecuting the suit against the seller-briber; and (5)
the attorney's fees. Except for recovery of the bribe, however, the
principal may satisfy his actual damages only once. He may not recover from both the briber and the bribee for the same damage.2 2
Furthermore, the principal may dismiss the disloyal agent without incurring any liability for breach of an employment contract.
Agents owe the highest duty of loyalty to their principal as an implied condition of the employment contract.23 If the agent accepts
a bribe the implied condition of loyalty is breached and the principal has sufficient cause to terminate the relationship.24
Finally, the agent forfeits any right to compensation for services
disloyally performed. 25 However, the agent's disloyalty does not
allow the principal to withhold compensation for prior or subsequent faithful service unless such payment includes some compenv. Odden, 220 Minn. 498, 20 N.W.2d 87 (1945); Doyen v. Bauer, 211

Minn. 140, 300 N.W. 451 (1941).

19. Tarnowski v. Resop, 236 Minn. 33, 36, 51 N.W.2d 801, 803 (1952);
Raymond Farmers Elevator Co. v. American Sur. Co., 207 Minn. 117, 290

N.W. 231 (1940).

20. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), AGENCY § 313, comment b (1958).
21. 236 Minn. 33, 51 N.W.2d 801 (1952).
22. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), AGENCY § 313, comment b (1958).
23. See Laube, The Right of an Employee Discharged for Cause, 20
MINN. L. REV. 597, 610-11 (1936).
24. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND), AGENCY § 409 (1958).
25. See HIlubeck v. Beeler, 214 Minn. 484, 489, 9 N.W.2d 252, 254
(1943); Sinna v. Sperry Realty & Inv. Co., 181 Minn. 183, 232 N.W. 5
(1930); Blackey v. Alexander, 156 Minn. 478, 195 N.W. 455 (1923);
Venie v. Harriet State Bank, 146 Minn. 142, 178 N.W. 170 (1920); RESTATEMENT (SECOND), AGENCY §§

456, 469 (1958).
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sation for wilfully disloyal service. Thus, if the agent received a
monthly salary he would forfeit the entire month's salary for any
month in which he was wilfully disloyal. 6 Although the principal
may not withhold the entire month's salary if the disloyalty was
unintentional,2' a bribed agent seldom violates his duty inadvertently. Hence, the bribee will forfeit all compensation for any
tainted payment period. Moreover, in Minnesota, forfeiture is not
limited to accrued unpaid wages; the principal may also recover
compensation that has been paid to the agent for the disloyal service before the disloyalty was discovered.'
C.

CONCLUSIONS

Despite their apparent breadth, the civil remedies available
against participants in a commercial bribe are basically ineffectual.
In the first place, it is difficult to ascertain and even more difficult
to prove that an agent has been bribed. The bribe is secretive by
nature and there are few outward manifestations which indicate its
occurrence. Although an agent's action is detrimental to his principal's interests, the inference that a bribe has occurred is slight;
even loyal agents make unsound decisions. And, unless the bribe
is extremely large, the agent's increased affluence would be unnoticeable and hence not suspect. Second, these civil remedies have
a negligible deterrent effect. The recovery of the bribe from
the agent leaves the agent in no worse position than before the
bribe. Similarly, the right to recover damages from the briber affords no greater protection because, in addition to being difficult
to show, the amount of injury to the principal's business will normally approximate the gain made by the briber. Certainly the major source of evidence of the extent of the injury caused will be
the gain to the briber. Moreover, the principal's right of rescission
merely returns the parties to the status quo. When the doubtful chance of detection and the doubtful extent of loss on the part
of the bribee and briber are weighed against the overwhelming
opportunities for success, the inadequacy of the civil remedies as a
deterrent to commercial bribery becomes manifest.
H.

MINNESOTA CRIMINAL STATUTES

Although not a completely reliable guide, it should be noted
that there are no reported cases involving prosecutions of commer26. See Hlubeck v. Beeler, 214 Minn. 484, 9* N.W.2d 252 (1943);
456 (1958).
27. Ibid.
28. Blackey v. Alexander, 156 Minn. 478, 195 N.W. 455 (1923).

RESTATEMENT (SEcoND), AGENCY §
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cial bribery under Minnesota criminal statutes. However, two Minnesota criminal statutes may apply to some commercial bribery
transactions. They are the larceny statute which deals with theft,
fraud and embezzlement, 29 and the swindling statute which
deals with the taking of another's property by trick or device.3"
A.

LARCENY STATUTE, SECTION

1

The first section of the Minnesota larceny statute proscribes the
obtaining of another's property by theft or by fraud.31 In general,
theft occurs where property is taken without the consent of the
owner. Fraud occurs where the owner's consent to the transfer of
property is obtained illegally. At least one type of commercial
bribery transaction may constitute theft of the principal's property.
Where the purpose of the bribe is not to secure an advantage in a
business transaction between the principal and the briber but rather where the bribe is offered in return for business information,
formulae, or processes there may be a theft.
To constitute theft under the statute it is necessary that a person
take "property" or an "article of value" from the true owner.32
This poses the question whether the term "property" or the phrase
"article of value" includes secret business information, formulae
or processes. An early Minnesota civil case held that in equity 33a
secret formula or process for making paint constituted property.
29. See MINN. STAT. § 622.01 (1957) :
Every person who, with intent to deprive or defraud the true owner
of his property, or of the use and benefit thereof, or to appropriate the
same to the use of the taker, or of any other person:
(1) Shall take from the possession of the true owner, or of any
other person, or obtain from such possession by color or aid of fraudulent or false representation or pretense, or of any false token or writing,
or secrete, withhold, or appropriate to his own use, or that of any person other than the true owner, any money, personal property, thing in
action, evidence of debt, or contract, or article of value of any kind;
(2) Having in his possession, custody, or control as a bailee,
servant, attorney, agent, clerk, trustee, or officer of any person, association, or corporation, or as a public officer, or person authorized by
agreement or by competent authority to hold or take such possession,
custody, or control, any money, property, evidence of debt or contract,
article of value of any nature, or thing in action or possession, shall
appropriate the same to his own use, or that of any other person than
the true owner or person entitled to the benefit thereof . . .
Steals such property, and shall be guilty of larceny.
30. MINN STAT. § 614.11 (1957).
31. See note 29 supra.
32. Only property and articles of value are relevant to commercial bribery, but the statute also proscribes the taking of money, things in action and
evidence of debts or contracts. See note 29 supra.
33. Elaterite Paint & Mfg. Co. v. Frost, 105 Minn. 239, 117 N.W. 388
(1908).
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A comment on the case, however, suggested that the decision
should not have been based on property concepts since "there is
no legally recognized property right in a trade secret or secret
process. ' 34 In Minnesota civil cases, as well as in those of other
jurisdictions, the term "property" has been held to denote certain
intangible interests such as processes, formulae, and goodwill. 35
In criminal cases in other jurisdictions, however, the term "property" has been held not to include such intangible interests as a
judgment debtor's address, a plan for a movie or a free game on
a pinball machine.3" Nevertheless, at least one federal case has held
that secret formulae, facts and figures constitute property within
the meaning of a criminal statute.37 The Minnesota court has not
discussed to what extent the term "property" as used in the larceny
statute includes intangible interests. But in view of the tendency of
the courts to construe criminal statutes strictly,3" there is considerable doubt as to whether the term "property" would be given the
same meaning in both civil and criminal cases. However, some intangible interests such as formulae or processes might be considered
"property" as used in the larceny statute, but it is extremely doubtful that ordinary business information or plans would be. In any
event, doubts as to whether the taking of such interests comes within the purview of the larceny statute may tend to discourage prosecution.39 The phrase "article of value" is not commonly used to
34. See Note, 14 MINN. L. Rv. 537, 539 (1930). "[This] is demonstrated

by the fact than anyone honestly and fairly acquiring knowledge of such
secret process, not patented, may use it." Id. at 539.
35. See Red Wing Malting Co. v. Willcuts, 15 F.2d 626 (8th Cir. 1926)
(goodwill); Durand v. Brown, 236 Fed. 609 (6th Cir. 1916) (secret process
and formulae); Waring v. Dunlea, 26 F. Supp. 338 (E.D.N.C. 1939) (musicians' performance); Middlemas v. Strutz, 71 N.D. 186, 299 N.W. 589
(1941) (game on pinball machine); Hansen Mercantile Co. v. Wyman,
Partridge & Co., 105 Minn. 491, 117 N.W. 926 (1908) (goodwill).
36. Washington Coin Mach. Ass'n v. Callahan, 142 F.2d 97 (D.C. Cir.
1944) (free games on pinball machine); State v. Miller, 192 Ore. 188, 233
P.2d 786 (1951) (oral guarantee of loan); State v. Waite, 156 Kan. 143,
131 P.2d 708 (1942) (free games on pinball machine); Futter v. Paramount
Pictures, Inc., 69 N.Y.S.2d 438 (Sup. Ct. 1947) (a plan, suggestion or arrangement involving motion pictures); Schwartz Estate v. Dunishtock, 175
Misc. 869, 25 N.Y.S.2d 741 (N.Y. City Ct. 1941) (judgment debtor's address).
37. See United States v. Procter & Gamble Co., 47 F. Supp. 676 (D.

Mass. 1942). The case is peculiar in that the defendant argued that larceny

-a

state crime-had been committed. Id. at 679.

38. The rule of strict construction of criminal statutes has been abolished
in Minnesota by MINN. STAT. § 610.03 (1957). However, the annotation
to MINN. STAT. ANN. § 610.03 (1947), and cases therein, indicate that in

interpreting penal statutes the court will not go beyond the clear meaning
to find something not clearly implied by the language used. See, e.g., Anderson v. Bumquist, 216 Minn. 49, 11 N.W.2d 776 (1943).
39. If there are legal doubts as to whether certain conduct constitutes a
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refer to intangible interests as the word "article" ordinarily connotes a material object.40 In the absence of an indication that the
word is to be given a special meaning, this ordinary meaning
should control.
A second problem may arise in applying section 1 of the larceny
statute to commercial bribes designed to obtain secret formulae,
processes or information. An intent to deprive an owner of the possession "of his property, or of the use and benefit thereof" must
also be established. Thus, it must be shown that if the bribe
achieves its purpose the owner will be deprived of the possession or
the use and benefit of his property. The principal may well be
deprived of substantial benefit as the formulae, processes, or information are no longer secret. However, a literal interpretation of
the statutory language would indicate that formulae, processes or
trade secrets could not be the subject of larceny since the principal
is not deprived of their use. This difficulty stems from the fact
that the standards used-possession or use and benefit-are tangible property concepts while the interests involved are not within
the traditional concept of tangible property. They are intangible
property rights. Thus, it appears that the larceny statute does not
effectively deter commercial bribes aimed at obtaining secret
business formulae, processes, or information.
Other commercial bribery transactions may constitute fraud under the larceny statute rather than theft since the principal's consent to the transfer of property is obtained, albeit illegally. The most
common purpose of commercial bribery is to influence a business
transaction between the principal and the briber. In these situations property normally passes from the principal to the briber
under the terms of a contract.4 1 Since the principal has consented
to the transfer it cannot be considered an unlawful appropriation
without proof that his consent was obtained "by color or aid of
crime, prosecutors will tend not to prosecute. First, the fact that it is not
clear that a crime has been committed indicates that the conduct is not so
morally reprehensible that the failure to prosecute will be criticized. Second,
prosecutors prefer to prosecute sure cases and do not like to take the

chance of losing if it can be avoided. Third, doubtful prosecutions mean
much more work for the prosecutors which at least some will try to avoid.
40. Gayer v. Whelan, 59 Cal. App. 2d 255, 138 P.2d 763 (Dist. Ct.
App. 1943). See also lunge v. Hedden, 146 U.S. 233 (1892); Harrison
Supply Co. v. United States, 171 Fed. 406 (1st Cir. 1909); People v.
Epstean, 102 Misc. 476, 170 N.Y. Supp. 68 (Ct. Gen. Sess. 1918).
41. The most common situation in the litigated cases is where the agent
received money for inducing the principal to buy or sell goods or services
to the donor at a price favorable to the donor of the bribe. A problem of
whether "property" is passing from the principal to the donor would appear to be presented only when the principal is performing services for the
donor of the bribe.
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fraudulent or false representation or pretense" 42 -in other words,
by fraud.
In the only criminal case discussing whether commercial bribery constitutes fraud, a federal district court held that commercial
bribery constituted a violation of the federal mail fraud statute.43 The court stated that the fraud consisted of the misrepresentation that the employee was loyal to his employer's interests." In
Erickson v. Frazier,45 a civil case, the Minnesota Supreme Court
held that inducing an unfaithful discharge of a duty, of trust was
actionable fraud. In Erickson, as in the federal mail fraud case, the
fraud consisted of depriving the principal of the faithful service of
his agent.4 6 In Sorenson v. Greysolon Co.,4" however, the court
based its finding of fraud on misstatements as to the value of certain property made by the agent to the principal. Although misrepresentations of opinion are ordinarily not a basis for a fraud
action, the court held that they were fraudulent when made by a
person in a fiduciary relationship to the injured party. The briber
was held responsible for the misrepresentations he induced; he
had hired the bribee as his own agent and, thus, under agency
principles, was responsible for his actions.4"
Arguably, each of the foregoing rationales supports to some extent the theory that some forms of commercial bribery may constitute criminal fraud where, as a result, the principal transfers
42. See MINN. STAT. § 622.01 (1957), set out in note 29 supra.
43. See United States v. Procter & Gamble Co., 47 F. Supp. 676 (D.
Mass. 1942). The court stated that "the misrepresentation may be as well
by deeds or acts, as by words-by artifices to mislead, as by positive assertions." Id. at 678.
44.
When one tampers with that relationship for the purpose of causing
the employee to breach his duty he in effect is defrauding the employer
of a lawful right. The actual deception that is practised is in the continued representation of the employee to the employer that he is
honest and loyal to the employer's interests. The employee, in using
the employment relationship for the express purpose of carrying out
a scheme to obtain his employer's confidential information and other
property, as alleged in the indictment, would be guilty of deliberately
producing a false impression on his employer in order to cheat him.
Such conduct would constitute a positive fraud ....
Id. at 678.
45. 169 Minn. 118, 210 N.W. 868 (1926).
46. Both of these cases stress only the fact of the agent's disloyalty as
the grounds for finding fraud. Although in both cases the agent performed
acts which did in fact injure the principal, the courts did not stress the
nature of such acts.
47. 170 Minn. 259, 212 N.W. 457 (1927).
48. The same result could have been reached under the principles of
conspiracy and accessories since the two were working together to perpetrate the fraud.
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property to a third party. The requisite causal relationship between the fraud and the transfer of property may be established, as in civil cases, by showing that the misrepresentation was
"material" to the transaction and that it was in fact relied upon by
the injured party.49 In many commercial situations there is little
question that the recommendations of the agent play an important
part in the principal's decision to enter into the transaction. This
occurs most often where the agent conducts the negotiations with
the briber or where the agent is authorized to enter into an agreement on behalf of the principal. However, the necessary reliance
and materiality might also be found in situations where the agent
serves only in an advisory capacity since businessmen often rely
upon the ability and judgments of their agents when entering into
contracts. Each case would present the factual issue of whether
the principal relied on the agent's judgment or opinion as to the
advisability of the contract in question. Where the agent did not
actively negotiate the contract, the causal connection may be difficult to prove for it involves a subjective determination of the principal's motivation; moreover, the extrinsic evidence available to
substantiate any determination of reliance may be negligible.
Thus, although some instances of commercial bribery may constitute violations of section 1 of the larceny statute, it would normally be very difficult, if not impossible, to produce evidence
sufficient to prove such a violation.
B.

LARCENY STATUTE, SECTION 2

Section 2 of the larceny statute is designed to prohibit embezzlement and related misappropriations of property by agents, employees, bailees, and trustees.5" To establish a violation of this section, as of section 1, it must be shown that "property" or an "article of value" was misappropriated. Once again the problem of
whether formulae, processes, and trade secrets come within those
statutory terms is presented.51 Second, it must be shown that the
person charged had the property in question in his possession,
custody or control or was authorized by agreement or competent
49. See Lehman v. Hansord Pontiac Co., 246 Minn. 1, 74 N.W.2d 305
(1955); Rien v. Cooper, 211 Minn. 517, 1 N.W.2d 847 (1941).
50. The statute requires that the property ba obtained "by means of" the
fraud. This would require a showing that the transfer was the result of
the fraud. See note 29 supra; Lehman v. Hansord Pontiac Co., 246 Minn.
1, 74 N.W.2d 305 (1955); Behrendt v. Rassmussen, 234 Minn. 97, 47
N.W.2d 779 (1951); Rien v. Cooper, 211 Minn. 517, 1 N.W.2d 847
(1942).
51. See text accompanying notes 33-42 supra.
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authority to take such possession, custody, or control.5" If the
agent is authorized to know the formulae, processes or trade secrets which he discloses to the briber, this requirement is satisfied."s Where the purpose of the bribe is to influence a business
transaction, it must be established that the agent had authority to
bind the principal or had such a degree of influence over the principal's decision that he may be considered to have had "possession,
custody, or control" of the assets transferred as a result of the
transaction. For example, in State v. Kortgaard 4 the court held
that an officer who had general management of a bank's affairs
and controlled the making of loans had possession, custody and
control of the bank's funds within the meaning of the larceny
statute. Thus, where the agent is authorized to, and does, enter
into the transaction on behalf of the principal the statutory requirement is satisfied.55 Arguably, the statutory requirement is
also satisfied where the agent in fact dominates the person or persons authorized to enter into the transaction although the agent
himself is not given such power under the business structure. This
may be inferred from the use of the terms "possession, custody, or
control" which in ordinary usage refer to a practical relationship
rather than to theoretical powers.5 6 It is doubtful, however, that
this requirement is met when another person is required to and in
fact does exercise his independent judgment as to whether to
enter into the transaction. In these situations the agent does not
have the personal control which the57 phrase "his possession, custody, or control" implies is necessary.
Thus, commercial bribery constitutes a violation of section 2 only
where the agent plays the dominant role in the transaction entered
into by or on behalf of the principal. The evidence needed to show
52. See State v. White, 108 Minn. 346, 122 N.W. 448 (1909); State v.
Holton, 88 Minn. 171, 92 N.W. 541 (1902).
53. If the agent is not authorized to know the information but obtains
it by stealth, it may not constitute a violation of this section but would
come under section 1.
54. 62 Minn. 7, 64 N.W. 51 (1895).
55. Where the agent has power to bind the principal in a transaction,
he has "control ' over that portion of the principal's assets to be used in the
transaction. See, e.g., State v. Irish, 183 Minn. 49, 235 N.W. 625 (1931);
State v. Kortgaard, 62 Minn. 7, 64 N.W. 51 (1895).
56. See State v. Murphy, 113 Minn. 405, 129 N.W. 850 (1911) (officer
of corporation having only de facto existence, thus no legally authorized
powers, had control); State v. Bourne, 86 Minn. 432, 90 N.W. 1108 (1902)
(proof of legal appointment of corporation officers not required).
57. It would be difficult to argue that a person had control over some
property if he did not have physical possession and could transfer it only
with the approval of another person.
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that the agent dominated the transaction would be similar to that
necessary to show materiality and reliance under section 158
C.

SWINDLING STATUTE

The Minnesota swindling statute59 proscribes the taking of another's property by use of instruments, tricks, devices or similar
means. The Minnesota Supreme Court has held that the statutory term "trick or device" does not refer exclusively to a physical
or mechanical contrivance; words in conjunction with conduct occurring in the course of a business transaction may also constitute
a "trick or device."' For example, the court has held that a
fraudulent investment proposal coupled with an offer of employment constitutes a trick within the meaning of the statute. 61 Similarly, the passing of a bad check coupled with the purchase of
goods and an order for other goods has been held to come within
the statute's prohibitions.6 2 Arguably, in view of the broad interpretation of the term "trick or device" which has been adopted by
the court, the bribing of an agent coupled with a representation of
continued loyalty is prohibited by the swindling statute. This statute, however, was not designed to encompass commercial bribery.
Again the problem of "property" could arise,63 and a causal connection between the "trick or device" and the transfer of property
must still be established.64 In any event, the swindling statute does
not outlaw any commercial bribe which the larceny statute does
not proscribe. Inadequacy of the larceny and swindling statutes as
58. See text accompanying note 51 supra.
59. MINN. STAT. § 614.11 (1957), which reads as follows:

Every person who, by means of three-card monte, so-called, or
of any other form or device, sleight of hand, or other means, by use
of cards or instruments of like character, or by any other instrument, trick, or device, obtains from another person any money or
other property of any description, shall be guilty of the crime of
swindling, and be punished ....

60. See State v. Yurkiewicz, 208 Minn. 71, 292 N.W. 782 (1940).
61. In State v. Yurkiewicz, 208 Minn. 71, 292 N.W. 782 (1940), the
court held that a fraudulent solicitation of investment funds coupled with
a contingent offer of employment constituted a trick although consisting
only of words and conduct.
62. In State v. Cunningham, 257 Minn. 31, 99 N.W.2d 908 (1959), the
court held that although the ordinary passing of a bad check did not constitute swindling, when it was coupled with a present purchase of goods and
a future order it came within the statute. See Note, 45 MINN. L. REv. 150
(1960), for a discussion of the swindling statute and of this case.
63. The basic nature of fraud and swindling are very similar in that
both involve deception of the intended victim. The means used must in

fact deceive the victim (reliance) and must prompt him to do something

he would not otherwise have done (materiality).
64. The statute requires that the property be obtained "by means of"
the trick. See statute quoted in note 59 supra.
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effective deterrents of commercial bribery also stems from the
fact that they were designed to deal with a different type of conduct. Consequently, the statutes fail to set forth an adequate standard for determining illegal conduct. Hence, an agent is unable to
determine whether he should accept a certain gift or gratuity even
though the practice is commonly followed in his particular business. Thus, the Minnesota larceny and swindling statutes may provide criminal sanctions for some forms of commercial bribery. A
third Minnesota statute supplements the operation of these statutes.
D.

ATTEMPT STATUTE

The Minnesota attempt statute proscribes acts "done with intent
to commit a crime and tending, but failing, to accomplish it."65
Therefore, where an agent accepts a bribe but does not succeed in
influencing the transaction, a felony may have been committed.
This in turn depends upon whether the bribe, if successful, would
have constituted a violation of the larceny or the swindling statutes.
However, a rejected bribe offer would probably not constitute a
violation of the attempt statute in any event. 66 The attempt statute
requires "the commission of some specific intentional overt act
tending in the natural course of events toward the commission of
the crime. '6 7 The naked solicitation of another to commit a crime
without more does not constitute a criminal attempt as the commission of the crime depends upon the agreement and further action of an independent party.6" The failure to encompass rejected
offers and solicitations of commercial bribes is a serious handicap
to the effective handling of commercial bribery from an enforcement standpoint since that is the one occasion where the wrongful
conduct may often be brought to the principal's attention.
III.

COMMERCIAL BRIBERY STATUTES

Since present Minnesota criminal laws do not provide adequate
protection against commercial bribery, legislative action is necessary if criminal statutes are to be relied upon to prevent dishonest
65. Mn N. STAT. § 610.27 (1957). See State v. Brooks, 151 Minn. 502,

187 N.W. 607 (1922), where the court upheld an attempted swindling conviction although the intended victim was not induced to part with his money.
66. See generally HALL, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 558-99

(2d ed. 1960), for a discussion of the problems involved in criminal attempts.
67. See State v. McLeavey, 157 Minn. 408, 196 N.W. 645 (1923);
State v. Lampe, 131 Minn. 65, 154 N.W. 737 (1915); State v. Dumas, 118
Minn. 77, 136 N.W. 311 (1912).
68. See State v. Lowrie, 237 Minn. 240, 54 N.W.2d 265 (1952).
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commercial practices. At least 17 states have some form of commercial bribery statute.69 The basic elements of these statutes are
similar. They prohibit the tender to an agent, or the solicitation
or acceptance by an agent, of gifts which are intended to influence his action with respect to his principal's business. Some of
the statutes have special provisions designed to aid in the enforcement of the basic provisions by requiring or encouraging the disclosure of violations by participants.7 0 The New York statute is
typical.7 1 Its provisions will be discussed in some detail.
State commercial bribery statutes are necessary to protect pri69. See CONN. GEN. STAT. REV. § 53-266-268 (1958); IOWA CODE
§ 741.1-.5 (1958); LA. REV. STAT. § 14.73 (1950); MASS. GEN. LAWS
ANN. ch. 271, § 39 (1956); MicH. COMP. LAWS § 750.125 (1948); Miss.
CODE ANN. § 2027-28 (1956); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-710 (1956); NEV.
REV. STAT. § 613.110 (1960) (applies only to the agents not the donor of
the bribe); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:170-88,89 (1953); N.Y. PEN. LAW
§ 439; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4667 (1945); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN.
§ 11-7-3 (1956); S.C. CODE § 16-570 (1952); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.1-404
(1950); WASH. REV. CODE §8 49.44.060, 49.44.070 (1951); Wis. STAT.
§ 134.05 (1959).

70. Six statutes have separate provisions which grant the courts the

power to compel testimony over the constitutional objection that it may

incriminate the witness and which provide protection for the person so compelled to testify. See CONN. GEN. STAT. REV. § 53-2, 68 (1958); IowA
CODE § 741.3 (1958); LA. REV. STAT. § 15.468 (1950); MASS. GEN. LAWS
ANN. ch. 271, § 39 (1956); MICH. CoMP. LAws § 750.125 (1948); N.Y.
PEN. LAW § 2447. Three statutes have immunity provisions to encourage disclosure. See LA. REv. STAT. § 14.73 (1950); MicH. CoMP. LAWS § 750.125
(1948); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:170-89 (1953). In addition, one statute
provides for recovery of double civil damages. See R.I. GEN. LAws ANN.

§ 11-7-3 (1956).
71. Section 439 reads as follows:
1. A person who gives, offers or promises to an agent, employee
or servant of another, any gift or gratuity whatever, without the knowledge and consent of the principal, employer or master of such agent,
employee or servant, with the intent to influence such agent's, employee's or servant's action in relation to his principal's, employer's
or master's business; or an agent, employee or servant who without
the knowledge and consent of his principal, employer, or master, requests or accepts a gift or gratuity or a promise to make a gift or to
do an act beneficial to himself or to another, under an agreement or
with an understanding that he shall act in any particular manner in
relation to his principal's, employer's or master's business, or receives

a reward for having so acted; or an agent, employee or servant, who
being authorized to procure materials, supplies or other merchandise
either by purchase or contract for or on account of the credit of his
principal, employer or master, or to employ services or labor for his
principal, employer or master, receives directly or indirectly for him-

self or for another, a commission, discount, gift, gratuity or bonus
from the person who makes such sale of contract, or furnishes such
materials, supplies or other merchandise, or from a person who renders such services or labor; and any person who gives or offers such
an agent, employee or servant such commission, discount, or bonus;
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vate individuals or corporations against violations of a duty of trust
occurring within the state. Although many commercial bribes come
within the purview of federal regulatory or criminal statutes,7 2
existing federal "regulation" of bribery is limited to specific
areas.7 3 All attempts to secure legislation to outlaw bribery
generally in interstate commerce have failed,74 even though the
practice is common.75 Such legislation is desirable since "state
laws may be hampered by jurisdictional limitations. '7 This jurisdictional defect might be cured by uniform state or federal
legislation on the matter.7' However, state commercial bribery
statutes may be proper despite federal regulation of the matter.
Some bribes will violate neither federal criminal or regulatory stat7
utes nor a state commercial bribery statute-such as New York's. 1
Thus, other state legislation is needed to prevent bribes in this
category.
The problem is whether the scope of state commercial bribery
legislation should be restricted to instances in which the principal
may suffer some business loss. 79 Apparently, the New York courts
and any person, corporation, partnership or other organization who
shall use or give to an agent, employee or servant of another, or any
agent, employee or servant who shall use, approve, or certify, with intent to deceive the principal, employer or master, any receipt, account, invoice or other document in respect of which the principal,
employer, or master is interested, which contains any statement which
is wilfully false or erroneous in any material particular or which omits
to state fully the fact of any commission, money, property, or other
valuable thing having been given or agreed to be given to such agent,
employee or servant, is guilty of a misdemeanor and shall be punished
by fine of not more than five hundred dollars, or by imprisonment for
not more than one year, or both such fine and imprisonment.
2. In any criminal proceeding before any court, grand jury or magistrate for a violation of the provisions of this section, the court, grand
jury or magistrate may confer immunity in accordance with the provisions of section two thousand four hundred forty-seven of this chapter.

N. Y.

PEN. LAw

§ 439.

72. See Note, 108 U. PA. L. REV. 848 (1960); Note, 45 Hv.
L. REV.
1248 (1932); Note, 28 COLtrM. L. REV. 799 (1928).
73. See Note, 108 U. PA. L. REV. 848, 849-50 (1960).
74. See Note, 28 COLUM. L. REv. 799, 804-05 (1928).
75. Id. at 803.
76. See Note, 45 HAnv. L. REV. 1248, 1249 (1932).
77. Id. at 1250.
78. People v. Levy, 283 App. Div. 383, 128 N.Y.S.2d 275 (1954). In
Levy, the state attempted to prosecute a basketball referee. For an explanation of the holding see Note, 108 U. PA. L. REV. 848, 853 & n.35 (1960).
At the present time 32 states have separate statutes prohibiting bribery in
athletics. See Id. at 864-65. Minnesota has such a statute. See MINN.
STAT. § 613.251 (Supp. 1960). It is doubtful that the referee's act would
violate any existing federal law. Id. at 849-50.
79. The general problem of the proper scope of commercial bribery
legislation is discussed in Note, 108 U. PA. L. REV. 848, 862-63 (1960).
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have literally interpreted the requirement that the bribe must be
tendered for the purpose of affecting the principal's "business."
They have refused to apply section 439 to a person offering a
bribe to an agent of a labor union" or to a basketball referee 8'
on the ground that the labor union and the referee's employer
were not conducting a "business" within the meaning of the statute. These decisions may be justified on the ground that New
York, like many other states,82 has special criminal statutes dealing with participants in athletic contests and the bribing of labor
union officials.8 3 Arguably, in nonbusiness cases the problems generated by the betrayal of confidence may best be treated separately
or as part of another regulatory scheme. However, the restriction of the general statute to "business" activities should be avoided
since it would neither be desirable nor possible to provide special
statutes for all "nonbusiness" activities involving agents where the
principal may suffer financial loss. Some states have avoided this
restriction by substituting the word "affairs" for the term "business."84 While such a statute may overlap other criminal or regulatory statutes the use of the term "affairs" may be necessary, in
view of the New York courts' determination to exclude those situations where complementary legislation does not exist. The question
deserves extensive consideration by any legislature preparing to
enact commercial bribery legislation.
In view of the demands made upon the individual by presentday business,8" the structure of the modem business organization, 6 and the continually changing business methods, it may be
argued that the terms of a commercial bribery statute should be
general and the operational scope of the statute broad. "On the
other hand, such general legislation presents the undeniable dangers of lack of clear warning in areas where the prevailing social
mores may be ambiguous and of opportunities for discriminatory
'
enforcement by complainants, prosecutors and criminal juries. "87
However, the statute need not be enforced where action is taken
under another statute, and perhaps a legislative direction to this
80. People v. Graf, 261 App. Div. 188, 24 N.Y.S.2d 683 (1941).
81. People v. Levy, 283 App. Div. 383, 128 N.Y.S.2d 275 (1954).

82. See Note, 108 U. PA. L. REV. 848, 864-67 (1960), which contains a
chart showing which states have various types of nongovernmental bribery
statutes.
83. See N.Y. PEN. LAw § 380 (labor officials); N.Y. PEN. LAW § 382
(sporting events).
84. See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. § 14.73 (1950).

85. See Note, 28 COLuM. L. REv. 799, 800 (1928).

86. See Note, 45 Hnv. L. REV. 1248 (1932); 28 COLUM. L. REV. 799,
800 (1928).
87. Note, 108 U. PA. L. REv. 848, 863 (1960).
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effect may solve the problem adequately until more definite action can be taken.
A.

PERSONS TO WHOM THE STATUTE APPLIES

Section 439 for the New York Penal Code is applicable only to
attempts to influence "agents, employees, or servants.""8 There is
a considerable body of law in each jurisdiction which determines
who are agents, employees or servants in other contexts. 9 In absence of a statutory definition, the scope of these terms as used
in commercial bribery statutes is determined on the basis of this
law. However, it may be argued that commercial bribery statutes
should be broader. With the addition of the terms "trustee" and
"fiduciary," such a statute would seemingly apply to tenders made
to all persons who hold a position of confidence and trust in regard to a private person.90 The use of these terms may be necessary as it is doubtful that the persons designated thereby would
otherwise come within the statute as they should where the "business" or "affairs" of another is involved. The Iowa statute also includes "representatives and officers" within its prohibitions,9 1 but
it would appear that those persons would also be agents or em-

ployees. Thus, the use of these terms is unnecessary.
B.

GIFT OR GRATUITY

Under section 439, as under many commercial bribery statutes, the briber must tender a "gift or gratuity" to the agent.9 2
88. See N.Y. PEN. LAW § 439. In addition to establishing a fiduciary
relationship it must be established that the person tendering the bribe had
knowledge of that relationship at the time of the tender. In Rosenwasser
v. Amusement Enterprise, Inc., 88 Misc. 57, 150 N.Y. Supp. 561 (App.
Div. 1914), the New York court held that there was no violation of § 439
where the disloyal agent had held himself out to the "briber" as a real
estate broker; the defendant, having no knowledge that the agent was not
a broker, paid him a commission for arranging the lease. The result is
sound, of course, since a person cannot have the requisite criminal intent
if he has no knowledge of the facts which make his action a crime.
89. In Wasilowski v. Park Bridge Corp., 156 F.2d 612, 614 (2d Cir.
1946), the court defined an agent as a person authorized by another to act
on his account and under his control. In National Wooden Box Ass'n v.
United States, 59 F. Supp. 118, 121 (Ct. Cl. 1945), the court defined an
employee as one who works for wages or salary in the service of another. Many other definitions of the same general nature and their application to specific facts may be found in any state's digest system. See 2 C.J.S.
Agency §§ 1-76 (1936); 56 C.J.S. Master and Servant §§ 1-59 (1948).
90. LA. REv. STAT. § 14.73 (1950), uses the phrase "any private agent,
employee, or fiduciary." By definition "fiduciary" includes any person who
holds a position of trust and confidence. See, e.g., State v. Russell, 265
S.W.2d 379, 381 (Mo. 1954).
91. IowA CODE § 741.1 (1958) uses the phrase "any agent, representative, or employee, officer or any agent of a private corporation ... "
92. See N.Y. PEN. LAW § 439, quoted in note 71 supra.
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These terms, unless interpreted very narrowly, seem to encompass anything which if given to the agent could prompt his
disloyalty-a proper statutory goal. Some statutes have used additional terms in attempting to set out more clearly the different
types of inducements which are prohibited. 93 It is doubtful, however, that the use of other terms would increase the operational
scope of the statute. Moreover, a list of specific items, if followed
by words of a general nature, should be avoided since the possible
application of the rule of ejusdem generis may restrict the scope
of the statute.9"
The gift must also be tendered "to" the agent. Thus, the question may be raised whether a gift to a friend or relative of the
agent may also be considered to be a gift "to" the agent. Where
the gift was the result of a prior agreement with the agent, the
statute should be interpreted to proscribe the gift although the actual transfer was to another person. When there is a prior agreement, the agent exercises control over the gift and presumably
uses that control to further his personal desires whether selfish or
altruistic. Seldom, however, will the gift to a friend be made out
of a sense of charity and normally it will only be an attempt to
disguise the bribe.95 Some states have attempted to insure that
these indirect gifts will not escape the statute by proscribing gifts
to the agent's spouse,9 6 to members of the agent's family, 97 or to
the agent "indirectly."9 Again, the specific enumeration should
be avoided, but the use of the term "indirectly" seems desirable
for it would not limit the scope of the statute and would prevent
an interpretation which would allow circumvention of the statute
by means of an indirect transfer.
93. See IowA CODE § 741.1 (1958) (any gift, commission, discount, bonus, or gratuity); Miss. CODE ANN. § 2027 (1956) (any money, goods,
chattels, right in action, or other property, real or personal); NEv. REv.
STAT. § 613.110 (1957) (any compensation, gratuity or reward); PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 18, § 4667 (1945)

valuable thing); R.I. GEN.

(any commission, money, property, or other
§ 11-7-3 (1956) (any gift or valu-

LAWS ANN.

able consideration); WASH. REv. CODE § 49.44.060 (1958) (any compensation, gratuity or reward).
94. The fact that the legislature thought there was a need to specifically
include gifts to certain persons implies that they did not intend the phrase
"to the agent" to include gifts to other persons. Moreover, where a specific

enumeration is followed by words of a general nature the meaning given

to the latter may be severely restricted by application of the rule of
ejusdem generis. See Note, 46 MiNN. L. REv. 169, 174-75 (1961).

95. This type of procedure in fact may often be adopted since it is much
more difficult to trace money which passes through many hands.
96. Miss. CODE ANN.§ 2027 (1956).

97.

PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4667 (1945).
CODE § 741.1 (1958); LA. REv.STAT. § 14.73 (1950); NEv.
REv. STAT. § 613.110 (1957); WASH. REV. CODE § 49.44.060 (1958).
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IN RELATION TO THE PRINCIPAL'S BUSINESS

Section 439 also requires that the bribe must be tendered with
an intent to influence the agent's action "in relation to his principal's business."99 Although the statute is primarily aimed at preventing conduct which would have an adverse effect upon the
principal, it is not necessary that the proposed action be either actually or potentially prejudicial to the principal. Furthermore, the
fact that the proposed action would, to some extent, benefit the
principal is immaterial since the statute seeks to insure the undivided loyalty of the agent. Whenever an agent accepts a gift which
he does not remit to his principal he has violated that duty.
The bribe must, however, affect the agent's actions in his
capacity as an agent. The proposed action must be intended to affect the operation of the principal's business, and it must involve
some activity in which the agent is, or should be, acting on behalf
of the principal. In People v. Jacobs,' the New York Court
of Appeals reversed a conviction under section 439 on the ground
that the gift was not designed to effect a change in the operation of
the principal's business in any way, although the gratuity was given
in return for information acquired as a result of the agent's employment. 01'
99. N.Y. PEN. LAW § 439. The provision relating to the agent who accepts the bribe uses the wording that he may not accept it under the agreement "that he shall act in any particular manner in relation to his principal's . . . business." Although the wording is different it would appear
that the same conduct would be included within each wording.
In addition, several of the other states have different tests as to what
gratuity induced conduct is prohibited. Although the Virginia test would
apparently restrict the application of that statute it would appear that the
other wordings are substantially similar to that of the New York statute.
See IOWA CODE § 741.1 (1958) (any gratuity connected with, relating to, or
growing out of such business transaction); Miss. CODE ANN. § 2027 (1956)
(with intent to influence his vote, opinion, action, or judgment); PA. STAT.
ANN.tit. 18, § 4667 (1945) (an inducement or reward for doing or omitting to do any act, or for showing or forebearing to show any favor or disfavor); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 11-7-3 (1956) (inducement or reward for
doing or forebearing to do, or for having done or foreborne to do); VA.
CODE ANN. § 18.1-404 (1950) (intent to influence his action to the prejudice of his principal's business).
Although these variations appear to concentrate on the situation where
the agent is acting on behalf of the principal and is authorized to bind the
principal, the wording seems broad enough to include opinions and judgments of the agent intended to influence the principal.
100. 309 N.Y. 315, 130 N.E.2d 636 (1955).
101. Ibid. The court indicated that the steamship company made no
use of passenger lists after the completion of the voyage and therefore was
little concerned about who received them or what they used them for.
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KNOWLEDGE AND CONSENT-BUSINESS CUSTOMS

Gifts tendered with the knowledge and consent of the principal
do not violate section 439.102 This qualification provides the principal with the power to exempt certain gifts from the operation of
the statute and thus to restrain business practices involving gratuities. It also has the effect of legalizing customary business practices unless the principal expressly objects to the acceptance of
such customary gratuities by his agents.
This latter effect results from the application of the doctrine of
constructive knowledge and implied consent. Although there appear to be no cases interpreting the knowledge and consent qualification as used in a commercial bribery statute, it is presumed that
a construction of that requirement similar to that developed in other
contexts would be adopted. Other constructions indicate that a
knowledge and consent requirement may be satisfied by a finding
of constructive knowledge and implied consent." 3 Constructive
knowledge may be found where the principal is aware of facts
which would have given actual knowledge to a reasonable man.'
It may also be found where the principal should reasonably have
been aware of such facts. 5 Consent to an act may be implied
where a person with actual or constructive knowledge takes no
affirmative action opposing it. 0 6 Thus, constructive knowledge
and implied consent to a gift can be demonstrated by evidence
which establishes that such gifts are customary in a particular trade
or business. For example, a principal should reasonably expect
that his traveling agent will be entertained by persons with whom
102. See N.Y. PEN. LAW § 439 quoted in note 71 supra. For examples
of the knowledge and consent qualification see Schiff v. Kirby, 22 Misc.
2d 786, 194 N.Y.S.2d 695 (1959); Norton v. John T. Clark & Son, 144
N.Y.S.2d 245, rev'd & modified, 2 App. Div. 2d 875, 156 N.Y.S.2d 233
(Sup. Ct.), appeal denied, 2 App. Div. 2d 966, 158 N.Y.S.2d 742 (1956),
appeal dismissed, 2 N.Y.2d 853, 160 N.Y.S.2d 4 (1957); June Fabrics v.
Teri Sue Fashions, 194 Misc. 267, 81 N.Y.S.2d 877 (Sup. Ct. 1948); General Automobile Supply Co. v. Rockwell, 162 N.Y. Supp. 210 (N.Y. City
Ct. 1916).
103. The term knowledge is generally employed to include constructive
knowledge which neither indicates nor requires actual knowledge. 51
C.J.S. Knowledge (1955).
104. See The Cleveco v. Szwed, 154 F.2d 605, 613 (6th Cir. 1946);
Hayward Lumber & Inv. Co. v. Orondo Mines, 34 Cal. App. 2d 697, 94
P.2d 380 (Dist. Ct. App. 1939); Kuntz v. City of New Orleans, 10 So. 2d
658 (La. App. 1942).
105. See King v. Karpe, 170 Cal. App. 2d 344, 349, 338 P.2d 979, 982
(Dist. Ct. App. 1959); Wermeling v. Shattuck, 366 Pa. 23, 28, 76 A.2d

406, 409 (1950).

106. See Indiana Harbor Belt R.R. Co. v. Jones, 220 Ind. 139, 145, 41
N.E.2d 361, 363 (1942); Delaney v. Delaney, 71 N.J. Eq. 246, 254, 65 Atl.
217, 220 (Ct. Err. & App. 1906).
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he is dealing. If he does not express disapproval of such practices, an agent may assume that he has consented to the acceptance
of such business entertainment by the agent.
In addition to the six statutes which contain the knowledge and
consent qualification,107 there are five statutes which impliedly
exempt customary business practices from their prohibitions through
other language. 08 These statutes contain the qualification that
the gift must be tendered "corruptly."'0 9 Although there are no
cases construing the term "corruptly" under these commercial
bribery statutes, the term seemingly indicates that an intent to
defraud must be shown." 0 If the conduct in question were customary in the trade or business, it is doubtful that the tender of
such a gratuity would be considered "corrupt" since there would
be no intent to defraud. Without the constructive knowledge and
implied consent doctrine or the "corruptly" qualification, ordinary
business entertainment would constitute a violation of commercial
bribery statutes. Apparently the Pennsylvania legislature intended
to insure this result. While the Pennsylvania statute contains the
knowledge and consent requirement, it prohibits the introduction
of evidence tending to show that gifts are customary to any particular trade or business."' The apparent legislative intent behind this provision is to insure that an undesirable business practice will not be deemed legal merely because it is customary. The
effect of the statute, in most cases, is to require the giver to seek the
express approval of the principal. Constructive knowledge can be
shown only through a course of past dealing or other facts peculiar
to the particular situation. The statutes in another group of states
would apparently have an effect similar to the Pennsylvania statute
107. IowA CODE § 741.1-.5 (1958); LA. REV. STAT. § 14.73 (1950);
§ 28-710 (1956); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:170-88, 89
(1953); PA. STAT. ANN.tit. 18, § 4667 (1945); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.1-404
NEB. REv. STAT.

(1950).
108. See CONN. GEN. STAT. REV. § 53-266 (1958); MASS. GEN. LAWS
ANN. ch. 271, § 39 (1956); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 11-7-3 (1956); S.C.
CODE § 16-570 (1952); Wis. STAT. § 134.05 (1959).
109. Ibid.
110. See cases cited under headings, "corrupt," "corruptly," and "corruption," in WORDS AND PHRASES for various suggestions as to how the
word may be applied. A corrupt act was defined in Foster v. United
States, 282 F.2d 222, 224 (9th Cir. 1960), as one done with a conscious
false intent. See Note, 108 U. PA. L. REV. 848 (1960).
111. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4667 (1945). That provision reads as follows:
Evidence shall not be admissible in any prosecution under this section
to show that a gift or acceptance of any commission, money, property
or other valuable thing, is customary in any business, trade or calling, nor shall the customary nature of such transactions be any defense
in any such proceeding or prosecution.

1962]

NOTES

621

since they contain neither the "knowledge and consent" nor the
"corruptly" qualification.' Literally read, these statutes also proscribe ordinary business entertainment provided to an agent since

presumably it is intended to influence his action in relation to his
principal's business. Although no case raising the question has
been found, these statutes evince an intention to apply a more
stringent standard than the statutes containing the "knowledge and

consent" or "corruptly" qualification.
This presents the question of whether "accepted" business practices should be excepted from the operation of commercial bribery
statutes. Arguably, they should not be; an attempt should be
made to set higher standards of ethical conduct than are currently
recognized and followed by the business community."' This would
be an admirable goal if an objective determination could be made
as to which practices should be prohibited and which should be allowed, and if the public at large were willing to accept and able
to enforce such higher standards of conduct. However, attempts to
raise ethical standards by legislation usually fail. In addition, there
would not appear to be a need to prevent all influential gratuities
to agents. For example, the Pennsylvania statute specifically allows
"tipping.""' 4 The exclusion of "tips" from the purview of the statutes is sound since the practice is universally followed and it only
112. See MICH. COMP. LAws § 750.125 (1948); Miss. CODE ANN. §
2027 (1956); NEv.REV. STAT. § 613.110 (1960); N.C.GEN.STAT. § 14353 (1943); WAsH. REv.CODE § 49.44.060 (1951). Itisdoubtful that the
practical effect would be any different since prosecutions would not be
brought where the employer consented. Concerning New York Penal Law
§ 439, a New York court said:
It appears obvious that, although the public is concerned with enforcing this statute in the public interest, any prosecution by reason of the
very nature of the offense charged, would be initiated on the complaint of an aggrieved principal or employer.
June Fabrics, Inc. v. Teri Sue Fashions, Inc., 194 Misc. 267, 271, 81
N.Y.S.2d 877, 882 (Sup. Ct. 1948).
113. See Note, 108 U. PA. L. REv. 848, 862-63 (1960).
Two approaches can be taken towards commercial bribery statutes; first
that such a statute should outline an ideal standard of conduct and improve present business practices, and second, that such a statute should
serve merely to prohibit what is presently termed corruption in the business community. Arguably, an attempt should be made to set higher standards of ethical conduct for businessmen than are currently recognized. See
Note, 108 U. PA. L. REv. 848, 862, 863 (1960). The Michigan legislature
has apparently made such an attempt. See MicH. COMP. LAws § 750.125
(1948). If taken literally the Michigan statute would prohibit most types
of business entertainment and perhaps even tipping. However, most attempts to raise ethical standards by legislation fail as did the attempt to
effect prohibition.
114. The exclusion reads as follows: "Nothing contained in this section
shall apply . . .to that practice which is commonly known as 'tipping.'
PA. STAT. ANN.tit. 18, § 4667 (1945).
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slightly affects the principal's business. The argument in support of
the exclusion of business entertainment from the prohibitions of
the statute is less strong, but it does not appear that such practices
cause any great harm. In absence of injury to the general public
it would, therefore, not be sound to attempt to impose higher
standards upon an unwilling business community.
However, the knowledge and consent requirement is a more satisfactory means of exempting business practices. Presumably, most
employers have actual knowledge of business customs and will instruct their agents accordingly. All that is essential for the protection of the principal's interests is that the principal be aware of
facts which will enable him to inquire if he should desire. Moreover, any attempt to exclude certain business practices and to specifically include others would result in a cumbersome and inflexible statute.
One question still remains: whether the "knowledge and consent" qualification is preferable to the "corruptly" qualification.
The "knowledge and consent" qualification tends to permit a more
objective determination than the "corruptly" standard. It points to
specific facts. Conversely, the term "corruptly" refers to a subjective determination of intent or purpose." 5 The more objective
standard is preferable unless it would facilitate the use of technical
defenses to avoid the statute since it more clearly defines the
crime." 6 It does not appear that the purpose of the statute would
be subverted by a qualification restricting application of the statute to those situations where the principal did not have knowledge
or consent to the transaction.

E. REWARDS
The requirements of the portion of section 439 which relate to
the agent are generally similar to those relating to the briber."7
However, an agent is specifically prohibited from accepting rewards for past action without the principal's knowledge and consent notwithstanding the fact that he did not act pursuant to an
agreement with a third party." s On the other hand, the tender of
a simple reward for past action by a third party is not prohibit115. See note 110 supra.
116. Mechanical and objective tests are often criticized because they are
too inflexible while subjective standards are criticized because they do not
provide adequate guides. It is true that flexible standards are often necessary in order to insure that justice will be achieved, but care should be
taken not to provide a flexible standard where a more objective approach
will achieve similar results.
117. See the New York statute quoted in note 71 supra.
118. Ibid.
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ed." 9 Arguably, this difference in treatment cannot be justified,
and the tender of a reward for past action without the knowledge
and consent of the principal should be prohibited.
Theoretically, there is little need to prohibit rewards for past
action since such rewards neither harm the principal nor encourage agents to violate their duties. 20 As a practical matter, however, such rewards may constitute a substantial inducement to favor the giver in subsequent business negotiations, even though it
was not so intended. Moreover, if rewards for past action are not
prohibited, the evidentiary value of the fact of payment-an important manifestation of a bribe-is to some extent limited. A person honestly desiring to reward an agent should be required to obtain the principal's consent. However, the operation of the statute
may be little affected by such a requirement; where subsequent
business activities with the principal are contemplated the requisite
intent may be easily inferred from the mere fact of payment.
F.

SPECIAL PROVISIONS

1.

Purchasingand HiringAgents

Several commercial bribery statutes'' have special provisions
which prohibit the tendering of gifts to purchasing and hiring
agents or the solicitation or acceptance of gifts by such agents. All
of these acts are prohibited without regard to intent or to the principal's knowledge and consent. 2 The mere tender, acceptance
119. The fact is that the first provisions dealing with a person giving
bribes to agents makes no reference to rewards. See the New York statute
quoted in note 71 supra. In view of the specific inclusion of such a reference in the provision dealing with agents it must be assumed that the legislature intended a different result.
120. Section 439 is principally for the protection of employers. Schiff v.
Kirby, 22 Misc. 2d 786, 194 N.Y.S.2d 695 (Sup. Ct. 1959); June Fabrics
v. Teri Sue Fashions, 194 Misc. 267, 81 N.Y.S.2d 877 (Sup. Ct. 1948).
Gifts made after the transaction, assuming no prior promise, would not
affect the transaction and therefore the employer would be in no need of
protection from such gifts.
121. See CONN. GEN. STAT. REV. § 53-266 (1958); MAss. GEN. LAWS
ANN. ch. 271, § 39 (1956); MIcH. CoMP. LAWS § 750.125 (1948); NEB.
REV. STAT. § 28-710 (1956); NEV. REV. STAT. 613.110 (1960); N.J. STAT.

ANN. § 2A:170-88 (1953); N.Y. PEN. LAW § 439; S.C. CODE § 16-570
(1952); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.1-404m(1950); WASH. REV. CODE § 49.44.060

(1958); Wis. STAT. § 134.05 (1959).

122. See, e.g., Wis. STAT. § 134.05 (1959), which provides for purchasing and hiring agents as follows:
. ..or an agent, employe or servant, who, being authorized to procure materials, supplies or other articles either by purchase or contract for his principal, employer or master, or to employ service or
labor for his principal, employer or master, receives directly or indirectly, for himself or for another, a commission, discount or bonus
from the person who makes such sale or contract, or furnishes such
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or solicitation of a gift constitutes a violation. These provisions
represent an attempt to avoid some evidentiary problems peculiar
to commercial bribery prosecutions in an area where the danger
of successful commercial bribery is relatively high. Where an
agent is given a kickback for purchasing from a particular person, his principal is not likely to suspect the bribe because he
must only pay the quoted-thus the expected-price. Similarly,
where an agent is able to demand a tribute from a person he has
hired, the principal must only pay the standard wage rate.
Another purpose of the special provisions relating to purchasing
and hiring agents is to protect persons dealing with such agents.
Small sellers and unemployed workers are ordinarily in a very
weak economic position vis-d-vis the purchasing and hiring agents
with whom they deal. Consequently, purchasing and hiring agents
may be able to demand the payment of a tribute from either sellers
or workers respectively. A striking example of the abuses which
may arise in this area was uncovered by investigations of the New
York City waterfront. -3 The investigations disclosed that union
officials forced employers to hire their men as hiring agents.
The stevedores, who were hired daily, were given work only if
they agreed to remit part of their wages to the hiring agents. The
problems presented by this situation, however, may be more properly dealt with as matters of labor relations rather than commercial bribery.'24 It would appear to be of little avail to attempt to
prevent such activities where the principal consents since the same
economic result could, in many cases, be reached if the principal
demanded more from the third party and at the same time increased the compensation of the agent. Any action of the agent
concerning a transaction on behalf of and with the knowledge
and consent of the principal should be considered the action of the
principal. Thus, the added stringency of these special provisions
may, in effect, proscribe actions of the principal. If these practices
are undesirable they should be prohibited whether or not the principal accomplishes a particular result by means of an agent.
materials, supplies or other articles, or from a person who renders such
service or labor; and any person who gives or offers such an agent,

employe or servant such commission, discount or bonus ....
123. See FOURTH RiPORT OF THE NEW YoRK STATE CRIME CoMMIsSION, NEw YoRc STATE LEG. Doc. No. 70 (1953); H.R. REP. No. 998,
83d Cong., 1st Sess. 5-6 (1953).
124. See New York Waterfront Commission Act of 1953, N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAWS §§ 9801-9937 (McKinney 1961); De Veau v. Braisted, 363

U.S. 144 (1960). These indicate the difficulty in dealing with these problems and suggest the futility of attempting to deal with such problems as

commercial bribery.
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ReportingProvisions

Two commercial bribery statutes contain provisions prohibiting
the use of erroneous documents to cover up bribery transactions. 2 '
They also require disclosure by the agent of any property given to
him in connection with any transaction.2 6 The hoped for effect
of these provisions is to bring to the attention of the principal any
gift or gratuity given to the agent which may have influenced the
agent's actions. In the event that such disclosure is not made the
agent is subject to the more easily proven charge of failure to report. These statutes require that the misstatement or omission be
made "with intent to deceive."' 27 Thus, the agent cannot be prosecuted for his inadvertence. However, an intent to deceive may be
inferred from the misstatement or omission of a fact. The question,
of course, is one for the jury.
Reporting provisions are desirable in that they allow a principal
to more intelligently determine whether his agent's judgment has
been objectively exercised. If the principal is forewarned of possible improper influences upon his agent, he will be able to take
appropriate action to protect his interests. Furthermore, in view
of the difficult problems of proving a violation of a bribery statute,
any provision which may ease that burden is desirable.
3.

Evidentiary Provisions
(a)

Compelled testimony

It has been said that "the difficulty of detecting commercial
bribery, which is augmented by the tactical necessity of concealing the crime from the employer, makes it unlikely that prohibitory
legislation alone can have any material effect."' 28 Thus, to aid
prosecutors in obtaining evidence sufficient to secure a conviction,
two types of provisions are used in conjunction with commercial
bribery statutes. The first of these, the compelled testimony provi125. See MicH. COMp. LAws § 750.125 (1948); N.Y. PEN. LAw § 439.
The Michigan provision reads as follows:
It shall be unlawful for any person to use or to give to an agent,
employe or servant or another, or for any agent, employe or servant,
to use, approve or certify, with intent to deceive the principal, employer or master, any receipt, account, invoice or other document in
respect of which the principal, employer or master is interested,
which contains any statement which is false, erroneous or defective
in any material particular or which omits to state fully the fact of any
commission, money, property or other valuable thing having been given or agreed to be given to such agent, employe or servant.
126. Ibid.
127. See note 125 supra.
128. 45 HAgv. L. RPv. 1248, 1250 (1932).
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sion, prohibits a person from refusing to answer questions on the
ground that he may, by his answer, tend to incriminate himself.'2 9
This constitutional objection is avoided by other statutory sections
which grant criminal immunity to persons so compelled to testify.
Since the self-incrimination provision of the federal constitution
applies only to federal action,' 3" the scope of the protection which
must be afforded in order to make such compelled testimony constitutional may vary according to the judicial interpretation placed
upon each state's constitutional provision against self-incrimination. 3 ' The Minnesota Supreme Court has held that the immunity
granted the witness "must be equivalent to . . . the crime disclosed" to meet the constitutional requirement. 32 This judicial
test is apparently satisfied by a general Minnesota statute which provides that no person shall be subject to criminal liability on account of any matter concerning which he was compelled to testify.' 33 In view of the constitutional interpretation adopted by
the court, it would appear that a lesser amount of protection would
render the practice of compelling testimony unconstitutional.
Some states, however, provide greater protection than is constitutionally required. For example, the Massachusetts' provisions
grant immunity from both civil and criminal actions. 34 Greater
protection than is constitutionally required may be justified on the
policy ground that a person compelled to testify against himself should not be injured in any way as a result. A sounder justification for broader immunity, however, is that if a person receives greater protection he will be more likely to tell the truth and
to disclose any pertinent information he has. Since a person
will be compelled to testify only if it appears that his testimony is
necessary it would appear sound to take affirmative steps to insure
129. See, e.g., IowA CODE- § 741.4 (1958); MICH. COMP. LAws § 750.125
(1948).
130. See Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46 (1947). The Supreme
Court held in this case that the provision of the fifth amendment against

self-incrimination was not made effective against state action by the fourteenth amendment.
131. See MINN. CONST. art. 1, § 7. The Minnesota constitutional provi-

sion reads: ".

.

. no person for the same offense shall be put twice in

jeopardy of punishment, nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be
a witness against himself. .. .
132. State v. Nolan, 231 Minn. 522, 44 N.W.2d 66 (1950).
133. MINN. STAT. § 610.47 (1957). In State v. Ruff, 176 Minn. 308,
223 N.W. 144 (1929), the Minnesota court upheld the constitutionality of
MINN. STAT. § 613.04 (1957), which provided that in the case of public
bribery a person could be compelled to testify, but granted him immunity
from prosecution on account of any matter which he was compelled to
disclose.
134. See MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 271, § 39 (1956).
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its accuracy in addition to the perjury sanction. The granting of
total immunity from civil process, however, would work an injustice upon persons who have civil claims arising out of the transaction concerning which testimony is given. Nevertheless, the use of
the coerced testimony in a civil action against the person compelled to testify should not be allowed since that particular evidence may well have been unavailable to the other party if testimony had not been compelled. Recovery may still be had on the
basis of other evidence. This would protect the person compelled
to testify and leave the injured party in no worse position than if
no criminal proceeding had been undertaken.
(b)

Voluntary disclosure

The second type of provision is found in three states; it is designed to encourage participants in commercial bribery transactions to come forward with evidence concerning the bribery transaction. Criminal immunity is provided to the first of the participants to supply evidence under oath which tends to convict the
other participants.'
Although these statutes, because of their
voluntary character, do not present a constitutional question of selfincrimination, they do present the question of how extensive the
grant of immunity need be to encourage disclosure. This consideration must be balanced against other interests including the rights
of other parties involved in the transaction.
Voluntary disclosure provisions may require that immunity
from commercial bribery prosecution be granted 3 6 or may simply
empower a court or prosecutor to grant such immunity. 1 7 Clearly such statutes should contain a self-executing grant of immunity from criminal prosecution for the crime of commercial
bribery. Otherwise the disclosure provision would amount to nothing more than a legislative declaration approving a practice now
commonly employed. Moreover, a self-executing provision is nec135. LA. REv. STAT. § 14.73 (1950); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 750.125
(1948); N.J. STAT.ANN.§ 2A:170-89 (1951).
136. For example, the Michigan statute states that the first person so
reporting and giving evidence "shall be granted immunity" from criminal
prosecution. MICH. COMp. LAws § 750.125 (1948).
137. The Louisiana provision reads as follows:
The offender under this article who states the facts, under oath, to
the district attorney charged with prosecution of the offense, and who
gives evidence tending to convict any other offender under this article,
may, in the discretion of the district attorney, be granted full immunity
from prosecution for commercial bribery, in respect to the particular
offense reported.
LA. REV. STAT. § 14.73 (1950).
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essary since few participants will come forward if they could be
prosecuted after having been induced to testify. It is precisely this
possibility which the self-executing provision seeks to avoid. However, if the grant of immunity is self-executing, it would be unwise to grant immunity from prosecution for all crimes which
may become apparent upon disclosure of the facts attending the
bribe unless disclosure provisions are enacted with respect to all
crimes, or the acts which constitute the bribe also constitute a
violation of the fraud, larceny, forgery or other criminal statutes.
The three statutes which have voluntary disclosure provisions
grant only immunity. from criminal prosecution; 3 s however, it
may also be necessary to grant immunity from civil suits arising out of the matter testified to in order to make the disclosure
provision effective. A compromise measure which merely prohibits
the use in a civil action of the admissions and statements of the
person offering the evidence provides adequate protection to the
informer and at the same time preserves the rights of third parties.
Moreover, the effectiveness of the disclosure provision would suffer little if only the use of the evidence was disallowed. In either
case the question of whether civil immunity will be granted should
not be left to the discretion of the public prosecutor; the legislature should determine whether the rights of third parties will remain intact.
Inasmuch as both compelled testimony and voluntary disclosure
provisions aid in the enforcement of commercial bribery statutes
they both should be used. Certainly each has a separate, distinct
and useful function.
4. Exemplary Damages
The Rhode Island commercial bribery statute provides for the
recovery of exemplary damages in a civil action by any person
injured as a result of a violation of the statute.1 39 Such a provision
would seemingly inspire more civil actions against the participants
in commercial bribes. This has a dual beneficial effect. The possibility that exemplary damages may be recovered by an injured principal may deter the commission of the crime; moreover, a greater
number of violations will be brought to the attention of the public
prosecutor. In view of the secretive nature of commercial bribery a
138. See statutes cited in note 135 supra.
139. See R.I. GEN. LAws ANN. § 11-7-6 (1956), which provides as
follows:
Any person injured by any violation of the provisions of ... [commercial bribery statute] may recover from the person or persons inflicting such injury twice the amount of such injury.
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provision which encourages individual awareness and private investigation is desirable.
But to insure that the voluntary disclosure provisions will not
be rendered ineffective where the person sued has voluntarily given testimony tending to convict other participants of commercial
bribery, he should not be obligated to pay exemplary damages in a
subsequently initiated civil suit.
5.

Penalties

The seriousness of commercial bribery as a crime has not been
generally agreed upon; the penalties imposed by the various commercial bribery statutes are not uniform. 1 0 However, two types
of penalties-fines and imprisonment-are usually provided for.'
A fine may be appropriate where the injured party fails to bring a
civil action against either the bribee or the briber, or where the
court determines that while imprisonment is not necessary the imposition of some penalty is appropriate. On the other hand, the
actual or potential seriousness of the crime may well call for imprisonment. The crime committed may be in substance, if not technically, tantamount to larceny or swindling. Arguably, the maximum amounts for both the fine and the possible term of imprisonment should approximate the statutory maximums presently found
in the larceny statute. Furthermore, in view of the unusual opportunities for the successful commission of the crime, a statute which
will have a strong deterrent effect is needed. And since commercial
bribery always involves the violation of a duty of trust, the potential
penalty should be severe. Whatever the penalty, courts should be
given broad discretionary powers to determine the extent to which
it will be imposed.'
CONCLUSION
Minnesota criminal laws and civil remedies do not effectively deter commercial bribery. In fact, it is doubtful whether the criminal
laws even prohibit such bribery. And the civil remedies only com140. The maximum amount of a fine that may presently be imposed for

violation of a commercial bribery statute varies from two hundred to five
thousand dollars. See WASH. REv. CODE §§ 49.44.020, 49.44.060 (1951)
($200.00); Miss. CODE ANN. § 2028 (1959) ($5000.00). The maximum
length of a sentence that may presently be imposed for a violation of a
commercial bribery statute varies from three months to ten years. See ME.
REv. STAT. ANN. ch. 136, § 17 (1954) (three months); Miss. CODE ANN.
§ 2028 (1959) (ten years). For a general index to all commercial bribery
statutes, see Note, 108 U. PA. L. REv. 848 (1960).

141. See Note, 108 U. PA. L. REv. 848 (1960).
142. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-353 (1953).
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pensate for injuries sustained from commercial bribery; they do not
deter the act. Thus, if commercial bribery is to be deterred, a
commercial bribery statute is needed. To meet this need the following statute is proposed. This suggested statute is based upon
section 439 of the New York Penal law; however, it incorporates
several changes so as to avoid the defects of the New York statute.
PROPOSED COMMERCIAL BRIBERY STATUTE
The following persons shall be guilty of commercial bribery:

Section 1. subdivision (1) Any person who gives, offers or promises, directly or indirectly, any gift or gratuity to any agent without
the knowledge and consent of his principal and with the intent to influence the agent's action in relation to his principal's affairs; or
subd. (2) Any agent who requests or accepts, directly or indirectly,
any gift or gratuity or a promise to make a gift under an agreement or
understanding that he act in any particular manner in connection with
his principal's affairs, or receives a reward for having so acted; or
subd. (3)
Any person who shall use or give to any agent, or any
agent who shall use, approve, or certify with intent to deceive the
principal any receipt, account, invoice or other document in which the
principal is interested which contains any statement that is erroneous
in any material particular, or which omits to state fully the fact of
any commission or gratuity given or promised such agent.
Section 2. In section 1 the term "agent" includes any agent, employee, servant, trustee, or fiduciary, and the term "principal" includes
any principal, employer, master, or other person to whom a fiduciary
duty is owed.
Section 3. In any prosecution under section 1, any person may be
compelled to testify by the court in accordance with section 610.47;
provided that no person so compelled to testify shall be criminally prosecuted on account of any action, matter, or thing so testified to, except for prosecutions for perjury committed in such testimony; nor
shall such testimony be used as evidence in any civil proceeding against
the person so testifying.
Section 4. Any person who may have committed commercial bribery who first reports the facts under oath with the consent or at the
request of a county attorney of this state and who gives evidence tending to convict any other person of commercial bribery, shall be granted full immunity from prosecution for commercial bribery with respect to the offense reported. Evidence obtained under section 3 shall
not be used in any civil proceeding against the person rendering such
testimony.
Section 5. Any person injured by any violation of section 1 may
recover in a civil action from the person or persons inflicting such
injury twice the amount of such injury; provided that this section shall
not apply to any person compelled to testify under section 3 nor to any
person who voluntarily gives evidence or testimony under section 4.
Section 6. Commercial bribery shall be punished by a fine of not
more than one thousand dollars or imprisonment for not more than
ten years or both.

